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STEMMING THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE:
SUGGESTED REVISIONS OF THE OUTER SPACE
TREATY BASED ON THREE
SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES
In today's nuclear age, technology has provided the ability to
destroy civilization as we know it.' In spite of this threat, annual
worldwide military expenditures have catapulted from $400 billion in
19792 to $600 billion in 1982' and were expected to reach $800 bil-
lion by the end of 1983.' This rapid acceleration in military spend-
ing, leaves little reason for optimism regarding disarmament in the
1980's.5 Now, military expansion is even pervading man's use of
outer space.
The competitiveness exhibited by spiraling military budgets on
earth has been paralleled by man's expansion into outer space. This
acute sense of competition is illustrated very well by what has been
termed the space race.6 Within one year after the Soviet Union sur-
prised the world by the 1957 launching of Sputnik I, 7 the United
States increased its space related research and development budget
1. The World After Nuclear War: Findings of the Washington Conference on the Long-
Term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War, 7 DISARMAMENT 8, 12, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/D58 (Spring 1984). In the aftermath of a 5,000 megaton nuclear exchange (medium
size exchange), survivors would face extreme cold, water shortages, lack of food and fuel, heavy
burden of radiation and pollutants, diseases, and severe psychological stress-all this in twi-
light or darkness caused by smoke from fires and fire storms.
2. U.N. Dept. of Public Information, Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 9, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/D59/9, at 10 (1979). Also, since World War II, direct costs of the arms race had
exceeded six trillion dollars as of 1979. This is equivalent to the combined gross national prod-
uct of the entire world for 1975.
3. U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 26, U.N.
Doc. ST/PSCA/D59/26, at 1 (1982).
4. The Prospects for Disarmament in the 1980's." Disarmament Week Forum, 7 Dis-
ARMAMENT 16, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/D58 (Spring 1984).
5. Id.
6. See generally Lovell, The Great Competition in Space, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 124 (1972).
Sir Bernard Lovell presents an interesting and enlightening reflection on the economic and
political motivations underlying space competiton between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
7. Id. at 127.
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from $6.5 billion to $10.5 billion.' During the next ten years, this
research and development budget was tripled by the United States
and was increased five times by the Soviet Union.9 This new frontier
of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States re-
sulted in NASA's budget being increased from $150 million in 1959
to $5.5 billion in 1966.10 This rush has resulted in the launching of a
formidable collection of statellites and other pieces of equipment into
space. "
Military satellites perform a variety of functions including navi-
gation, communication, meteorology and geodesy.1 2 While seventy-
five percent of all satellites serve a military function,' 3 outer space
has remained almost free of weaponry. 4 One exception to the non-
aggressive character of previous satellites is the Soviet anti-satellite
interceptor (ASAT) which they began testing in 1967.3 Although
the Soviets have never publicly admitted testing these "killer satel-
lites," United States sources claim that sixteen ASAT tests were con-
ducted by the Soviet Union between October 1968 and April 1980.16
This "secretive" deployment of ASATs marked the first real threat of
an arms race in outer space. The United States is also involved in
ASAT development but has not deployed any of these weapons in
8. Id. This constitutes a dramatic increase of one percent of the gross national product.
9. Id. at 128.
10. Id. at 129. Although considered technologically behind the Soviet Union in space
exploration in the decade following the launching of Sputnik I, the United states, through these
dramatic budget increases, was able to stage a coupe de grace by landing astronauts Armstrong
and Aldrin on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969.
11. As of April 1982, the United States had 425 near earth satellites and 30 space probes.
The Soviet Union had 642 near earth satellites and 25 outer space probes. Also, the United
States had 2,185 pieces of space debris (junk) and 44 pieces of space probe debris while Russia
had 1,127 pieces of debris and I I pieces of space probe debris. The total for all 18 nations
involved in space exploration was 4,651 at that date. Finch, Law and Security in Outer Space:
Implications for Private Enterprise, II J. SPACE L. 107, 108 (1983).
12. Jasani, Outer Space: A New Dimension to Warfare? 4 DISARMAMENT 13, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/D58 (Spring 1984). Geodesy is a branch of applied mathematics that determines
the exact positions of points and the figures and areas of large portions of the surface of the
earth, the size and shape of the earth, and variations of terrestrial gravity and magnetism.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 948 (1971).
13. Jasani, supra note 12, at 13. Military function as used here means that a satellite
performs a service which is either necessary or beneficial to a military organization.
14. Goedhuis, Some Observations on the Efforts to Prevent a Military Escalation in Outer
Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 13 (1982).
15. Jasani, supra note 12, at 18. The Soviet ASAT is a device which is maneuvered adja-
cent to the target satellite, then detonated destroying the target with shrapnel.
16. Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International Law, 26 MCGILL L.J.
136, 158 (1981). Ten of these tests were judged by American analysts as successes, although no
spokesman has asserted that any of the U.S.S.R.'s own targets were actually destroyed nor that
any U.S. satellites were interfered with.
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outer space.' 7
While these devices are non-nuclear, I their development has led
to a keen awareness of the dangers of a military escalation in space.19
Negotiations to ban or limit ASAT weapons have been fruitless.20
The threat to peaceful uses of outer space has been dramatically in-
tensified by President Reagan's plan to develop anti-ballistic missile
weaponry designed to operate from earth orbit. 2' The new weaponry
would be based on the technology of lasers, particle beams and "rail
guns."122 While some scientists have expressed doubts about the tech-
nology,23 the message seems clear: we are about to witness the dawn
of an unprecedented arms race in space.
This Comment is devoted to a discussion of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. 24 The discussion will include an examination of its
peaceful purpose, different interpretations of this purpose, along with
the goals and intentions of the two major parties in formulating the
Treaty. Following the discussion of this peaceful purpose, the
Treaty's arms control capacity will be analyzed. Next, a survey of
three successful arms limitation agreements will be made to ascertain
the language of certain provisions which have enabled these treaties
17. Goedhuis, supra note 14, at 18, 19. One United States system launched from a high
speed, high flying aircraft, would intercept the target using an infrared homing device, and
would explode and destroy the target. The second device is a non-explosive, maneuverable
vehicle with an infrared sensor which would ram and destroy the target after guiding itself
from its own orbit. A third system is similar to that of the Soviet Union's where an orbital
device is guided to its target from earth and when in close proximity is detonated causing the
destruction of the other satellite by shrapnel from the explosion.
18. See Finch, supra note II, at 108. "Non-nuclear" means these weapons use conven-
tional explosives.
19. Jasani, supra note 12.
20. Report of the Committee on Disarmament, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 27) at 103,
U.N. Doc. A/37/27 (1983).
21. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
22. Space-War Era, It's Already Here, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 1984, at 28
[hereinafter cited as Space- War Era]. For a discussion of lasers and particle beams, see Robin-
son, Beam Weapon Advances Emerge, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1984, at 18.
Lasers depend on an intense beam of light to destroy their target. A particle beam weapon
operates on a similar principle only it uses sub-atomic particles (electrons) to accomplish the
same purpose.
For a discussion of "rail guns," see Robinson, Defense Dept. Developing Orbital Guns,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 23, 1984, at 61. A "rail gun" is a weapon which
converts electrical energy to magnetic pressure which propels projectiles at very high velocities
to destroy the target. At present, these guns can fire a projectile at velocities in excess of 6.2
miles per second.
23. See Space War Era, supra note 22, at 28.
24. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as the Outer Space Treaty].
Vol. 16
3
Hylin: Stemming the Arms Race in Outer Space: Suggested Revisions of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
REVISION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
to function as intended. Finally, suggestions for revisions to the
Outer Space Treaty will be synthesized from these three treaties. The
goal of these proposed revisions is to make the Treaty more effective
in carrying out its peaceful purpose.
I. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The Outer Space Treaty is considered a non-armament treaty.25
It was designed to prevent a new form of "colonial competition" in
space and prevent the damage that self-seeking exploitation might
cause.26 The Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.27
The Treaty emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space28 and,
through Article IV, restricts military activities in two ways. First,
the Article contains a mandate not to place in orbit around the earth,
nor install on the moon or celestial bodies, any nuclear weapons or
any other weapons of mass destruction.29 Second, Article IV limits
the use of the moon to peaceful purposes, and expressly prohibits its
use for (1) establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications;
(2) testing weapons of any kind; or (3) conducting military maneu-
vers.3" Because of the immediate threat to the peaceful use of outer
space posed by orbital weapons, 31 concern must be focused on the
meaning of "peaceful purpose" and the ability of Article IV to pre-
serve this objective.
25. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ARMS CONTROL AND Dis-
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 48 (1980 ed.) [herein-
after cited as ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS]. Non-armament means the
treaty was intended to prevent arms or weapons from being placed in areas under its purview.
26. Id. See also Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Implementation of the Rules of
International Space Law, 19 COL. J. TRANS. L. 213 (1981). Shortly after the launching of the
first space craft, it was thought the world would see a period where States would claim sover-
eignty over parts of outer space. The Outer Space Treaty was formulated to establish outer
space as the common heritage of all mankind and promote international cooperation in the
exploration and use of outer space. Id. at 214-19.
27. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, at 49.
28. See generally, Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, Preamble.
29. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. IV states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military person-
nel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon
and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
30. Id.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss1/12
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
A. Peaceful Purpose
The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recognizes "the com-
mon interest of all mankind in the. . . exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes."32 This seemingly simple statement re-
flects the United Nations premise that outer space should be used
only for peaceful exploits. 3 However, it must be kept in mind that
the phrase "peaceful uses of outer space" is not a legal term of art.3 4
Hence, this phrase can have different interpretations depending on
the viewer's perspective, as well as differing interpretations from one
document or treaty to another. 35 Consequently, there are two dis-
tinctly identifiable interpretations of the meaning of peaceful
purpose.36
1. The Soviet View. Generally, the Soviet definition of peaceful
uses of space excludes any activity of a military nature.37 Recently,
however, the Soviet perspective has grown more inconsistent, rang-
ing from a call for total demilitarization to the idea that peaceful uses
do not preclude retaliation against an aggressor. 3  The Soviets have
yet to describe any of their space launchings as having a military
function in the register maintained by the UN Secretary General.39
In spite of this omission an estimated seventy percent of Soviet satel-
lites serve a purely military function.' While advocating an ASAT
32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24.
33. C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN LAW OF OUTER SPACE 14 (1982). By resolution, on
December 13, 1958, the United Nations created the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. The Committee was instructed to prepare a detailed report on space problems including
the legal aspects of space exploration.
34. Butler, Peaceful Use and Self Defense in Outer Space, PROC. TWENTY-SIXTH COL-
LOQ. LAW OF OUTER SPACE 77 (1983).
35. Id. at 77-78.
36. Id. at 78
37. Jaksetic, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views, 2 AM. U.L. REV. 483, 493
(1979).
38. Id. at 495-96. A survey of Soviet writings reveals several apparently inconsistent
views on the peaceful uses of outer space. The following are some examples:
(1) The 'peaceful uses of outer space' means that all activities in space must be of a
nonmilitary nature; that is, space should be completely and totally demilitarized.(2)
The Outer Space Treaty provides for complete demilitarization of the Moon and
other celestial bodies, but only partial demilitarization of outer space.(3) The princi-
ple of the peaceful uses of outer space does not preclude retaliation against an aggres-
sor made via outer space or the use of space in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.(4) The use of satellites for military surveillance is aggressive because it
threatens the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the nation-state under
surveillance.(5) Satellites may be used to ensure compliance with certain treaties, e.g.,
the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting Antiballistic Missiles.
39. Goedhuis, supra note 14, at 18.
40. Butler, supra note 34, at 79.
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treaty, the Soviets have refused to acknowledge their own ASAT ca-
pability.4 By denying their own military activity in space, the Sovi-
ets have demonstrated that their view of "peaceful" still equates to
non-military functions in outer space. This is true even though their
activities in outer space have not been consistent with their concept
of peaceful uses.42 The Soviets are thus able to characterize their
own activities as noble while contending that United States use of
outer space is aggressive, militaristic and hence non-peaceful.43
2. The United States View. The United States interpretation of
peaceful uses is termed non-aggressive." Under this view, any mili-
tary activity in space would be considered permissible as long as the
activities could not be construed as intentionally aggressive.45  In
practice, the United States has declared it a national policy to use
space for peaceful purposes, while at the same time pursuing national
security objectives through non-armament type military activities.46
For practical reasons, this non-aggressive definition has gained
general acceptance 47 due to the increased recognition of the impor-
tance of earth satellites.48 Satellites have become essential for mili-
tary reconnaissance, early warning, communications, navigation and
meteorological missions.49
Space technology has also become an important element in the
strategic doctrines of both the Soviet Union and the United States.5"
The technology is used not only for treaty verification,51 but for pre-
41. Vlasic, supra note 16, at 148-49.
42. Jaksetic, supra note 37, at 496.
43. Id. at 494-95. According to Jaksetic:
Since the beginning of the space age, Soviet writers have contended that: (I) the Cold
War is the midwife of the United States' space research, (2) the West seeks to use
space for its aggressive purposes, (3) the American exploration of space 'is
subordinated to plans for its military utilization,' (4) the United States plans to use
the moon for military purposes, (5) United States communications satellites will be
used for purposes of Cold War propaganda, (6) American cooperation with other
nations in space activities is designed to further militaristic goals of the Pentagon,
produce profits for United States monopolists, and allow for the dumping of obsolete
United States space equipment on other nations.
44. Goedhuis, supra note 14, at 16.
45. Id. at 17. Under this view, weapons serving a deterrent role would not be considered
intentionally aggressive and thus would constitute use of space for peaceful purposes.
46. Hill, Permissible Scope of Military Activity in Outer Space, 24 A.F.L. REV. 157, 164
(1984).
47. CHRISTOL, supra note 33, at 22.
48. See Jasani, supra note 12, at 20.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Butler, supra note 34, at 79.
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cise navigation by missile target guidance systems.52 These practical
uses of space technology are now viewed as having a stabilizing effect
on tensions between the super-powers. 53 Thus, non-aggressive mili-
tary uses of outer space have become accepted as "peaceful." 54
The non-aggressive view of peaceful uses of outer space is con-
sistent with Article III of the Outer Space Treaty which dictates that
activities in space be conducted "in accordance with international
law, including the Charter of the United Nations . . .,,'" Neither
international law nor the UN Charter prohibits military activity, per
se.56 Only threats or the actual use of force is prohibited."' The in-
herent right of self-defense is also reiterated in the United Nations
Charter.5" Since the non-aggressive definition accommodates non-
threatening military activity and recognizes the use of defensive mili-
tary devices, it seems to be more compatible with current interna-
tional law.
Many of the satellites deployed for navigation, early warning,
and verification are seen as having a stabilizing influence and hence,
serve a peaceful purpose. 9 However, several questions remain un-
resolved. Does this indicate that any device or system which could
be construed as contributing to strategic stability would be deemed as
serving a "peaceful purpose"? More to the point, if it is said that a
purely defensive weapon would enhance stability, will this weapon be
serving a "peaceful purpose"? These questions characterize a trend
which would justify the placement of virtually any weapon in spaceW
creating a direct conflict with the original intent of the parties.
52. CHRISTOL, supra note 33, at 20.
53. Hill, supra note 46, at 163. If a nation lost some or all of its military satellites, stabil-
ity would suffer due to loss of the essential strategic elements of reconnaissance, early warning,
communications and navigation. Vlasic, supra note 16, at 20.
54. Id. See also CHRISTOL, note 33, at 22.
55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. III.
56. Butler, supra note 34, at 78. See also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202
(H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952). In fact, war itself is not considered illegal, but merely a condi-
tion to be regulated, either by customary or conventional international law.
57. This is demonstrated by the U.N. Charter which states: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
58. Id. Article 51 states in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations .... "
59. See supra text accompanying note 53.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17, 46-53.
Vol. 16
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3. Intention of the Parties. In 1966, shortly before adoption of
the Outer Space Treaty, the United States UN Ambassador Goldberg
proferred the American view:
It was a matter of the utmost necessity that the space age should
continue to evolve in an environment of peace, law and co-opera-
tion. The old political problems of the earth were not [to be] en-
trenched anywhere else. Political conflicts on earth need not
inhibit the development of a meaningful legal regime governing
the activities of men and states elsewhere.
6 1
Similarly, UN Ambassador Morozov of the Soviet Union stated the
problem as:
Whether outer space . . . [was] to become an area of peace and
international co-operation or [was] to be used by the forces of ag-
gression for purposes inimical to the interests of peace-loving peo-
ples. All men of good will expected constructive steps to be taken
to lay down rules of international law for regulation of state activ-
ity in the exploration and use of outer space.
62
These statements by the ambassadors of the United States and of the
Soviet Union would seem to indicate a strong intent to keep aggres-
sive conflict from entering the space environment. In light of these
two statements surrounding the creation of the Outer Space Treaty, a
much narrower definition of "peaceful uses" should result; one under
which even defensive weapons in space would probably not be ac-
commodated. Nevertheless, actions of the parties in creating ASATs
and the current plans to deploy new anti-ballistic missile systems
63
must be viewed as a contradiction of their earlier statements about
"peaceful purposes." It is the vague character of the term "peaceful"
which creates such concern about the ability of the Outer Space
Treaty to prevent an arms race in space.
B. The Arms Control Capability of the Outer Space Treaty
Article IV, of the Outer Space Treaty reads in part:
States parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around
the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner.
64
61. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.58 reprinted in 3 N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE, MAN-
UAL ON SPACE LAW 37-38 (1981).
62. Id. at 40.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
64. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. IV. para. 1.
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Legitimate concerns have been raised about the inadequacy of this
provision due to the limited constraints it places on the types of
weapons which may be introduced into outer space. 6' The ambigu-
ous nature of the language found in Article IV is illustrated by the
phrase which prohibits "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction" from being placed in orbit around the
earth.66 The question is, what weapons are prohibited under this
language?
1. Conventional Weapons. It is widely conceded that conven-
tional weapons are permitted under the Outer Space Treaty.67 This
interpretation is borne out by the ASAT development of both the
United States and the Soviet Union in which only non-nuclear explo-
sive devices are used.68
2. Nuclear Weapons. The first sentence of Article IV mandates
that: "States parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons . "...69
Thus, the Outer Space Treaty expressly prohibits nuclear weapons in
earth orbit.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction. To date, the only generally
shared definition of the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" was
set forth in 1948 by the UN Commission for Conventional Arma-
ments. 7° The Commission stated that: "weapons of mass destruc-
tion should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons,
radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weap-
ons, and any weapons developed in the future which have character-
65. CHRISTOL, supra note 33, at 25.
66. Hasselmann, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Article IV Outer Space Treaty and the
Relationship to General Disarmament, PROC. TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQ. LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 99, 108 (1982). The author states:
The term 'weapons of mass destruction' in Art. IV (1) is a dynamic one. Its content
varies, following technological and political developments. Its role as a decisive fac-
tor in controlling the arms race in outer space will gain importance with the increas-
ing armaments by states and their inability to conclude a treaty banning all weapons
in outer space.
67. See Hill, supra note 46, at 164. See also Comment, The Treaty on Outer Space: An
Evaluation of the Arms Control Provisions, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 276 (1968).
68. Hasselman, supra note 66, at 108.
69. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. IV. No source was found on this topic which
proffered an argument that nuclear weapons could be acceptable under the Outer Space Treaty.
There were also no sources found indicating that nuclear weapons have ever been placed in
orbit.
70. Hasselman, supra note 66, at 106.
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istics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or
other weapons mentioned above.""' Although this definition specifi-
cally forbids nuclear, radioactive, chemical and biological weapons,
the latest technological developments such as lasers, particle beam
weapons, and microwave devices present more difficult problems of
interpretation.
Although "mass destruction" has been defined as "the destruc-
tive effect of an atomic bomb," '72 a serious problem remains in defin-
ing the term "weapon."" Several factors have been developed in a
recent article by Hasselman which are relevant in determining the
ordinary meaning of "weapon":
(1) the design of the instrument;
(2) its objective capability;
(3) the subjective intention of the users;
(4) the modalities of its use;
(5) the effect caused.74
As a hypothetical example of this problem imagine a solar
power station whose beam could be diverted from supplying a city
with energy to melting icebergs or destroying crops in any given geo-
graphical area, thus causing death and destruction on the scale of a
nuclear device."' Using the aforementioned definitional criteria, the
potential effect of this normally beneficial device could place it in the
realm of weaponry subject to the treaty.76
It has been stated that laser and particle beam weapons are ac-
ceptable under Article IV because they are "point" weapons and not
indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction.77 Hypothetically, if suf-
ficiently powerful, they could be used to destroy manned space sta-
tions or even wreak havoc on earth cities. Again, using the
definitional criteria, the subjective intent of the user may be Intercon-
tinental Ballistic Missile defense but, this weapon's objective capabili-
ties of mass destruction could bring it under the purview of Article
IV. A further illustration of the divergence in interpretation of the
term "weapon" is the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the Amer-
71. U.N. Doc. S/C.3/30 (Aug. 13, 1948), quoted in Hasselmann, supra note 66, at 106.
72. Id.
73. Hill, supra note 46, at 164-65.
74. Hasselman, supra note 66, at 101. It is beyond the scope of this article to expound on
each of these criteria.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Butler, supra note 34, at 79.
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ican space shuttle as a potential weapons system. 8
These examples are but a few which illustrate the ambiguities
pertaining to Article IV. It must be remembered that international
law is generally proscriptive in nature: what is not excluded is al-
lowed.79 Future space weapons systems may include neutron flux
weapons, laser-directed nuclear energy which reduces warning times
to one second, plasma jets heated millions of degrees into the fourth
state of matter, and ionized gas (ball lightning) directed by radio at
high velocities.80 Whether these weapons are permissible under Arti-
cle IV would appear to be only a matter of the user's or the opposing
State's interpretation of that article.
In the course of the nuclear arms race there have been few peri-
ods when opposing sides were willing to limit their weapons.' With
the exception of the Soviet ASAT devices, there are currently no
weapons in outer space. However, with both powers developing
space-based weapons systems, 82 only a relatively short time exists
83
to revise Article IV into a more formidable arms control measure.
II. COMPARISON OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY WITH ARMS
LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS OF THREE SUCCESSFUL ARMS
CONTROL TREATIES: THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY, 84 THE SEABED TREATY,8 5
AND THE ABM TREATY
8 6
In surveying these three treaties, the provisions within each
agreement which have allowed that treaty to function as a successful
78. Woetzel, Responsibility for Activities in Outer Space with Special Reference to Article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, PROC.TWENTY-FIFrH COLLOQ. LAW OF OUTER SPACE
159, 160 (1982); see also, Vogt & Mervosh, Space Arms Control: A Difficult Process, PROC.
TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQ. LAW OF OUTER SPACE 167, 168 (1982). The authors state: "In-
deed, the Soviets even believe their national security is threatened by direct broadcast satellites
and various remote sensing activities. Such views cause a perceived need to counter these sys-
tems and result in the development and deployment of such things as antisatellite weapons."
79. Butler, supra note 34, at 79.
80. Woetzel, supra note 78, at 160.
81. Finch, supra note I1, at 109.
82. Butler, supra note 34, at 79.
83. Finch, supra note 1i, at 109.
84. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71.
85. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor, Feb. Ii, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter cited as the Seabed Treaty].
86. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-
Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as the ABM Treaty].
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arms limitation instrument will be determined. The Antarctic and
the Seabed Treaties were chosen for analysis because they are analo-
gous to the Outer Space Treaty in that they deal with restraints
which are applicable to newly accessible environments.87 The ABM
Treaty was chosen because the immediate intent of both the United
States and the Soviet Union in developing laser and particle beam
weapons is Intercontinental Ballistic Missile defense." Hence, the
goal of limiting anti-ballistic missile weapons found in the ABM
Treaty should also be applicable to the Outer Space Treaty.
1. The Antarctic Treaty. Major provisions of this treaty are
directed toward the preservation of Antarctica "exclusively" for
peaceful purposes. The non-militarization of the area, banning of all
nuclear detonations and a unique system of unilateral inspection for
verification of Treaty provisions are also provided. 9
The Antarctic Treaty has the same "peaceful purpose" doctrine
as the Outer Space Treaty; the avowed purpose of the Treaty is to
maintain the "non-militarized" status of the continent.9 The success
of the Antarctic Treaty in maintaining the non-militarization of the
area is due in large part to Antarctica's limited strategic value.9 In
addition, neither of the superpowers have acquired direct vested mili-
tary interests in the area.92 The same is not true of outer space since
both super powers have not only realized the military advantages of
using new technology in space, they have engaged in military activi-
ties in orbit since the beginning of the space age.9" This does not
mean, however, that the Antarctic Treaty has nothing to offer toward
improving the Outer Space Treaty as an arms control measure.
Included in the Antarctic Treaty is a unique inspection system
wherein each signatory designates its own inspectors who have com-
87. See generally, Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements, 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255 (1972). Antarctica, outer space, and the deep seabed have common characteris-
tics which influenced negotiations: (I) they have become accessible recently due to new tech-
nology, (2) the environments [at least until recently] have not been considered strategically
vital by the superpowers, (3) the environments are not subject to national sovereign rights
comparable to those over land or airspace, and (4) since neither the superpowers nor any other
state has ever engaged in prohibited activities, the military establishments have not acquired
direct vested interests in such activities.
88. See Vlasic, supra note 16, at 164-65.
89. Woetzel, supra note 78; see also Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L. &
CoMP. L.Q. 436, 468 (1960).
90. Stein, supra note 87, at 259.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 258-59.
93. Vlasic, supra note 16, at 149-50.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss1/12
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
plete freedom of access throughout Antarctica.94 This was a pioneer-
ing achievement in that it represented the first time the United States
and the Soviet Union both agreed to a verification system for unau-
thorized military activity. 9s
The important achievements of the Antarctic Treaty, through
verification, have been the prevention of an extension of the arms
race onto that continent along with the aversion of international
strife and conflict over Antarctica.9 6 Conversely, for outer space, ex-
cluding celestial bodies, no provisions concerning verification are
found in the Outer Space Treaty.97 The only verification provisions
in the Outer Space Treaty pertain to the moon and other celestial
bodies.9" Thus, the Antarctic Treaty, with its emphasis on complete
verification highlights at least one deficiency in the Outer Space
Treaty.
2. Seabed Treaty. The Seabed Treaty, like the Outer Space
and Antarctica Treaties, was created expressly to maintain use of the
seabed "exclusively for peaceful purposes."99 The Seabed Treaty,
like the Outer Space Treaty, prohibits the parties from emplanting or
emplacing nuclear weapons, or any other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, on the ocean floor."° As in the Outer Space Treaty, the use of
conventional weapons is not constrained by the Seabed Treaty.' 0 '
The problems of definitional ambiguity which surround the phrase
"weapons of mass destruction" apply equally to the Seabed Treaty.
However, a unique aspect of this Treaty is the ability of the Dis-
armament Committee of the United Nations to request interpretive
explanations from the superpowers.° 2 The sponsors have responded
to requests by clarifying, inter alia, that nuclear mines cannot be
anchored to the seabed, that certain banned practices do not apply to
commercial activities, and that bottom crawling vehicles designed for
94. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 84, art. VII; see also Hanessian, supra note 89, at 471.
95. Hanessian, supra note 89, at 471.
96. Segarra, The Question ofAntarctica, 6 DISARMAMENT 50, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/D58,
(Autumn/Winter 1983).
97. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24.
98. Id. The first sentence of Article XII states: "All stations, installations, equipment and
space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other
states parties to the treaty on a basis of reciprocity."
99. Treves, Military Installations, Structures, and Devices on the Seabed, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 808, 815 (1980).
100. Stein, supra note 87, at 264.
101. Id. at 265.
102. Id. at 266.
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nuclear weapons are not permissible.10 3 This clarification procedure,
although not expressly provided for in the treaty, would be a valuable
addition to the Outer Space Treaty in light of the diverse construc-
tions possible for the terms "peaceful purposes" and "weapons."
Similar to the Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed Treaty also contains
a provision for signatories to reconvene at certain intervals to amend
or review the treaty's operation."°c Periodic review conferences were
not provided for in the Outer Space Treaty, 05 but appear to be a
valuable method of steering the operation of a treaty toward the pur-
pose the parties intended. 1'I The review of the Seabed Treaty, held
in September 1983, concentrated on its mandate in Article VII of the
basic agreement."0 7 Article VII requires the conference "to review
the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes
of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
Such a review shall take into account any relevant technological de-
velopments."10 8 Through general debate, an article-by-article review
took place."o The Conference concluded that no evidence had been
presented to indicate that technological developments were adversely
affecting the operation of the Treaty."° The review also concluded
that the Treaty was a significant disarmament measure and was suc-
cessfully accomplishing its intended purpose. I' The review confer-
ences have been assessed as a very important factor in the success of
103. Id. at 266-67. As the author explains:
It was explained that submarines and submersible vehicles able to navigate in the
water above the seabed and designed to carry nuclear weapons are considered to be
like any other ship and would not be violating the treaty, even if anchored to, or
resting on the bottom. Nevertheless, bottom-crawling vehicles (creepy-crawlers),
which can move only when in contact with the seabed and which are specifically
designed to use nuclear weapons, are prohibited. It was made clear that the treaty
does not prohibit such peaceful uses of nuclear energy as nuclear reactors, scientific
research and peaceful nuclear explosions. When a number of members of the Dis-
armament Committee [of the U.N.] pointed out that the Test Ban Treaty had prohib-
ited all nuclear explosions under water and that the Seabed Treaty would not effect
this ban, the sponsors declared that the latter treaty would not affect obligations
under other arms control measures.
104. Goldblat, The Seabed Treaty: Its History, Scope, Verification and Implementation. 6
DISARMAMENT 53, 60, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/D58 (Summer, 1983).
105. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24.
106. George & Owens, The Second Review Conference of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty--
A Retrospective Assessment 7 DISARMAMENT 94, 100, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/D58 (Spring,
1984).
107. Id. at 94.
108. Seabed Treaty, supra note 85, art. VII.
109, George & Owens, supra note 106, at 99.
110. Id. at 98.
Ill. Id. at 100.
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the Seabed Treaty. t I 2
Review conferences provide an opportunity for the parties to
evaluate the functioning of a treaty. ' 3 Because the world is on the
brink of an arms race in space, "4 the need for a similar review con-
ference to assess the continued viability of the Outer Space Treaty
becomes self-evident.
3. The AIM Treaty." 5  It appears doubtful that either direct
energy lasers or particle beam weapons are prohibited by the Outer
Space Treaty."t 6 The danger posed by deployment of these weapons
is summed up by the following statement: "The prospect of a suc-
cessful pre-emptive strike associated with directed-energy devices is
so ominous that even the slightest evidence of asymmetry between
the two superpowers in the development of this weapon could not fail
to produce a dramatic political and military reaction."' 7  In re-
sponse to this fear of asymmetry, the Soviet Union and the United
States bilaterally agreed to prohibit development, testing, or deploy-
ment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based anti-ballistic missile sys-
tems in the ABM Treaty."18
Outwardly, the ABM Treaty appears to prohibit the deployment
of directed energy weapons which would be used for anti-ballistic
missile defense." 9  Nonetheless, these weapons could still be
deployed in an ASAT role without breaching the ABM Treaty. 20
112. Id. The authors declared:
It is quite apparent that this review has fulfilled the letter and spirit of Article VII of
the Treaty. The successful outcome of this conference has strengthened the Seabed
Treaty's importance and usefulness. The Treaty continues to be judged a meaningful
measure that enhances the security of all states and the cause of world peace.
113. Id. at 94.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
115. An antiballistic missile system (ABM) is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory. Comment, The Legality of A High Technology Missile
Defense System: The ABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 419 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Legality of Missile Defense].
116. Id. at 423.
117. Vlasic, supra note 16, at 165. The term assymetry as used here refers to one of the
superpowers "falling dangerously behind the other in the acquisition of weapons which may
alter the strategic equilibrium." Id.
118. ABM Treaty, supra note 86, art. V, para. 1.
119. Id. art. V.
120. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
98TH CONG., IST SESS.; FISCAL YEAR 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS 266-67
(Joint Comm. Print 1983) (Statement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) [herein-
after cited as 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS]. The ABM Treaty bans develop-
ment, testing and deployment of all antiballistic missile systems which are sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based. Thus, the Treaty prohibits directed energy technology (or
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Again a question of interpretation arises. 1 21 Would these weapons be
construed as being only ASAT weapons or could they also be con-
strued as anti-ballistic missile devices?
Forseeing the importance of maintaining the strategic "balance
of power," which is the objective of the Treaty, the parties provided
for a Standing Consultative Commission to resolve problems such as
the one mentioned. 122 In the same manner as the clarifications re-
quested by the Disarmament Committee in conjunction with the Sea-
bed Treaty, 121 this procedure differs only in that it has been formally
incorporated in the ABM Treaty. The effectiveness of the commis-
sion is demonstrated by the fact that in each case raised by the
United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased, or
additional information placated United States concerns. t24 Similarly,
Soviet concerns about possible violations by radar apparatus in the
United States appear to have been satisfactorily resolved.' 2  Since
these same problems arise under the Outer Space Treaty, a similar
provision added to that Treaty would provide an invaluable tool in
the maintenance of its peaceful purpose.
The ABM Treaty, in the same manner as the Seabed and
Antarctic Treaties,126 calls for a review by the parties at five year
intervals. 127  The first such review was conducted by the Standing
Consultative Commission in 1977.128 Both parties agreed that the
Treaty had operated effectively, that it continued to serve national
security interests, and that no amendments were necessary.
129
All three of these treaties contain tangible, workable provisions
any other technology) used for this role. However, with regard to directed energy systems in
an ASAT role, only the actual use of those systems to interfere with devices (satellites) used to
verify compliance with strategic arms control agreements is prohibited under provisions of the
ABM Treaty (art. XII).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
122. See ABM Treaty, supra note 86, art. XIII. The phrase "balance of power" is synony-
mous with "strategic equilibrium" discussed supra note 117.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
124. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, at 138.
125. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 55, CoM-
PLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS 4 (1979).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 10 and 108.
127. ABM Treaty, supra note 86, art. XIV.
128. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, at 138.
129. Id. Current directed energy research programs are not constrained by existing arms
control agreements. Nevertheless, future development, testing, or deployment of directed en-
ergy weapons having some ballistic missile defense potential could create conflict with obliga-
tions assumed by the United States under provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, consultation
and amendment of the Treaty will be necessary. See 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATE-
MENT, supra note 120, at 265-66.
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which are instrumental in their effectiveness as arms control meas-
ures. These workable provisions provide a sound basis for overhaul-
ing the arms limitation sections of the Outer Space Treaty.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Three distinct reasons exist for revising the existing Treaty in-
stead of attempting to formulate a new agreement.
First, the Soviets have submitted a draft treaty on the prohibi-
tion of weapons of any kind in outer space to the United Nations
General Assembly. 3 ° This proposal was rejected by the United
States and several other Western countries. 3 ' This reaction was
based on the Reagan Administration's feeling that the United States
is in an unsatisfactory military position with respect to the Soviet
Union. 32 Therefore,it is predicted that the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the United States will be one of military competi-
tion for the indefinite future.133 Even though the superpowers have
recently resumed arms limitation negotiations, the Reagan Adminis-
tration steadfastly refuses to negotiate regarding space-based defense
weapons. 134
Second, in the survey of the three Treaties, several useful provi-
sions were pointed out which are not presently contained in the
Outer Space Treaty. These provisions have been previously agreed
upon in these other treaties and therefore might be more readily ac-
cepted than an entirely new agreement. Since a separate outer space
weapons control measure appears unlikely, these previously agreed-
upon provisions should be more palatable to the superpowers, if in-
corporated into the existing Outer Space Treaty.
Third, the advantage of working through an existing treaty is
that the non-superpower signatories can exert a decisive influence
over the superpowers and bring about the needed changes in the
Outer Space Treaty. The non-superpower signatories are presently
championing the peaceful use of space and opposing an arms race in
130. Legality of Missile Defense, supra note 115, at 423 n.51. For text of the proposed
treaty see U.N. Doc. A/36/192. The Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of
Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space was submitted to the General Assembly on August 10,
1981.
131. Id.
132. ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 31 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984).
133. Id.
134. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 4. President Reagan stated regarding the Strate-
gic Defense Initiatve: "we will not bargain this research and testing program away."
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space.' 35 The United Nations describes the role the non-superpowers
play in arms control today:
[I]t cannot be denied that the world, the vast majority of states, is
becoming impatient. The Special Session of the General Assembly
Devoted to Disarmament was one of the first symptoms of that
impatience. The smaller nations requested the session and are
largely responsible for its Final Document, which establishes an
institutional framework for continued discussion in which these
very nations can play a role. They want to raise their voices be-
cause they will be the first victims if a war should occur.
136
The following revisions to the Outer Space Treaty are suggested
in response to those voices.
(1) Forbid both offensive and defensive arms in outer space so
as to give true meaning to the "peaceful purposes doctrine" and to
maintain the "balance of power" intended in the ABM Treaty. Ban-
ning weapons of a defensive nature would effectively make the argu-
ment that defensive weapons are designed to keep peace and hence
serve a "peaceful purpose" moot. 137 Banning all weapons in space,
both offensive and defensive, eliminates the possibility of disrupting
the present "balance of power" between the United States and the
Soviet Union. 3 If new frontiers for weapon expansion are elimi-
nated, the status quo (present "balance of power") will be much eas-
ier to maintain.
(2) Include a verification procedure similar to that provided in
the Antarctic Treaty, which permits any signatory to inspect any fa-
cility as long as he does not interfere with the functions of the facil-
ity. '9 Under this proposal, verification provisions would apply to all
areas of outer space, not merely the moon and other celestial
bodies. 11
Endless problems may arise concerning arms verification in
space.' As an example, if the Space Shuttle is considered a poten-
135. See Woetzel, supra note 78, at 160.
136. UNESCO, ARMAMENTS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 277 (M. Thee 3d ed.
1981).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
138. See supra text accompanying note 122.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
141. For an interesting discussion of verification problems in conjunction with the pro-
posed U.N. sponsored International Satellite Monitoring Agency, see Jakhu & Trecroce, Inter-
national Satellite Monitoring for Disarmament and Development, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
509 (1980).
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tial weapons system, 42 then, what sort of vehicle could possibly be
agreed upon as an effective verification vehicle?' 43 Such problems
would be interesting but, will only arise if outer space is subject to
total verification, not merely the moon and other celestial bodies.
Thus, provisions for verification should extend to earth orbit where
most weapons would be placed.
(3) Institute clarification procedures such as those used in inter-
pretation of the Seabed Treaty and the ABM Treaty by the Standing
Consultation Committee. This will facilitate creation of practical
and productive definitions of what devices may be considered "weap-
ons." This procedure would also eliminate most of the definitional
problems associated with useful and peaceful, but potentially danger-
ous technology such as space-based energy systems."
(4) Provide for mandatory review conferences similar to those
contained in the Seabed Treaty and the ABM Treaty in order to up-
date, revise, and revitalize the amendments and the Outer Space
Treaty as a whole. This procedure would keep the Treaty current
and effective in dealing with new technology as well as other social,
political and legal changes.' 45 This process may also serve to periodi-
cally revitalize the "peaceful purpose" of the Treaty in contrast to
the deterioration it is presently experiencing.
4 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The modern arms race shows no inclination of slowing.' 47 In-
stead, the world is faced with an imminent expansion of this threat
into the final frontier of outer space.' 4
Because of ambiguous terms in the Outer Space Treaty, it is
doubtful the instrument can effectively prevent an arms race in
space.' 49 Because the superpowers are not negotiating concerning
space-based defense weapons, it would be easier to revise the Outer
Space Treaty rather than to attempt to draft a new instrument. 50
The revisions based on successful provisions of the Antarctic Treaty,
142. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
143. The limited scope of this article does not permit full discussion of verification
problems.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12, 122-29.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 7-23.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 32-80.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
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the Seabed Treaty and the ABM Treaty would greatly enhance the
arms limitation capacity of the Outer Space Treaty.151
The time to act is now, before the superpowers make an irre-
trievable investment both monitarily and in national security. If the
world stands idly by, this opportunity to halt an ever increasing
threat of Armageddon may be lost forever.
Carl F Hylin
151. See supra text accompanying notes 84-129.
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